Greg Biffle Plane Crash: NTSB’s Shocking Update!

The aviation community was rocked today by the release of a preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the tragic plane crash involving NASCAR driver Greg Biffle.

The details provided in this report have the potential to reshape public understanding of the events leading up to this devastating incident.

The preliminary report details the crash of November 257 Bravo Whiskey, a Cessna Citation 550, which occurred near Statesville, North Carolina, on December 18th at approximately 10:15 AM Eastern Standard Time.

Tragically, the pilot and all six pᴀssengers onboard were fatally injured.

According to the NTSB, the aircraft was positioned on the south parking ramp for pᴀssenger loading and pre-flight.

Ground personnel confirmed that the aircraft was fully fueled before departure, and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) began capturing audio at 9:44:21 AM.

The CVR revealed that the airline transport-rated pilot was seated in the left seat, with his adult son—a private pilot—occupying the right seat.

A rear seat pᴀssenger, also a private pilot with multi-engine and rotorcraft ratings, was positioned near the cockpit.

This arrangement raises questions about the qualifications and readiness of the individuals onboard, particularly concerning the pilot’s limitations regarding his type rating for the Citation 550.

The pilot had type ratings for various aircraft, including the CE-500, which is required for flying the Citation 550.

However, he held a limitation that mandated a second-in-command be present during flight operations.

It is unclear whether the pilot’s son or Greg Biffle were aware of this limitation, but it is reasonable to ᴀssume that the pilot himself was fully cognizant of it.

The decision to operate the aircraft without a qualified second-in-command raises significant concerns about the safety protocols in place during this flight.

Next, we turn our attention to the weather conditions at the time of the accident.

At 9:45 AM, the Statesville automated weather observing system reported visibility of 10 miles with a ceiling of 3,900 feet broken and 4,800 feet overcast.

Just nine minutes later, visibility remained at 10 miles, with scattered clouds at 3,900 feet and an overcast ceiling at 5,000 feet.

These conditions may have contributed to the pilot’s decision to proceed with the flight, as they did not appear particularly hazardous at the time.

The report indicates that engine start was initiated using onboard battery power, and after an initial unsuccessful attempt to start the left engine, both engines were successfully started by 9:53 AM.

As the aircraft taxied out at 9:59 AM, the pilot and the two pilot-rated pᴀssengers discussed an inoperative thrust reverser indicator light for one of the engines, but they confirmed that the thrust reverser itself was functioning properly.

The aircraft took off under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) at 10:06 AM, with the intention of activating an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan once airborne.

Notably, the report mentions that the pilot performed the takeoff while his son managed the checklist and communicated with air traffic control.

During the takeoff roll, the rear pᴀssenger commented that the left engine seemed to be producing more power than the right, suggesting a potential discrepancy in engine performance.

Despite this observation, the pilot continued with the takeoff.

This raises two critical points for discussion.

Firstly, the NTSB report does not mention any pre-takeoff briefings regarding emergency protocols, which are essential when multiple pilots are present in the cockpit.

Clarity about roles and responsibilities during an emergency is crucial, especially when there is a third pilot on board who could potentially ᴀssist.

Secondly, the decision to take off VFR and obtain an IFR clearance after departure, while legal given the reported weather, could be seen as a risky choice.

In conditions where visibility and alтιтude clearance might be uncertain, obtaining IFR clearance before takeoff could have reduced the stress of managing those factors once airborne.

Once airborne, the aircraft made a climbing left turn following takeoff.

At 10:07 AM, the pilot stated he would remain VFR until receiving their IFR clearance.

However, by 10:08 AM, the aircraft had made a 180-degree turn and begun to descend.

The right seat pᴀssenger attempted to contact air traffic control to activate their IFR flight plan three times but was unsuccessful due to the controller’s workload.

This situation exemplifies a critical gap in the Swiss cheese model of aviation safety, where multiple factors converge to create a hazardous scenario.

The weather conditions had changed significantly since their pre-flight checks.

By 10:15 AM, approximately nine minutes after takeoff, the visibility had decreased to 5 miles with heavy drizzle, and the cloud ceiling had dropped to broken at 1,200 feet, with overcast conditions at 5,000 feet.

Such rapid changes in weather can create challenges for pilots trying to maintain visual flight while navigating around clouds and terrain.

At around 10:09 AM, a discussion occurred between the pilot and the rear pᴀssenger about climbing to a higher alтιтude, despite the requirement to remain VFR.

The aircraft had descended to approximately 1,580 feet MSL at that point.

The pilot initiated a climb, but the rear pᴀssenger noted a discrepancy in the temperature indications of the left and right engines.

Following this, the autopilot was disengaged for reasons not specified in the report.

As the flight progressed, the pilot expressed concerns about the functionality of his alтιтude indicator and other left-side flight instruments.

The NTSB noted that the Garmin system, which records airspeed and heading data, ceased functioning around this time.

This moment appears to mark a critical juncture in the flight, where the pilot’s workload increased dramatically due to instrument failures and challenging weather conditions.

At 10:11 AM, control of the aircraft was transferred to the right seat pᴀssenger at an alтιтude of 4,500 feet.

Notably, no comments were recorded indicating malfunctions with the right-side cockpit instruments, suggesting that the son may have had functional instruments available to him.

However, the audio recording from the left seat microphone was lost for nearly four minutes, creating a gap in the information needed to understand the decisions being made at that time.

When the control transfer occurred, the aircraft was already engaged in a left-hand turn.

The temporary loss of audio means we lack crucial evidence regarding why they decided to turn back to the airport rather than declaring an emergency and communicating with air traffic control to navigate through the weather or gain alтιтude for stabilization.

By 10:13 AM, at an alтιтude of approximately 1,870 feet MSL, the pilot and both pilot-rated pᴀssengers reported visual contact with the ground.

The pilot requested the flaps be extended and soon after called for the landing gear.

However, despite extending the gear, the indicator lights did not illuminate, prompting the right seat pᴀssenger to communicate, “We’re having some issues here.”

This sequence of events indicates that the pilot may have been attempting to manage the aircraft’s systems while dealing with the weather.

Once they could see the ground, the pilot resumed control.

However, the presence of electrical malfunctions, such as the gear indicator lights not functioning and the GPS device failing to record data, raises significant concerns about the aircraft’s operational integrity.

At 10:14:05, the rear pᴀssenger inquired about power to the alternator, likely referring to the generator or some other electrical component.

Shortly after, the audio quality returned, and the pilot remarked that they had identified the problem, although he did not specify what it was or what actions were taken to rectify it.

As the aircraft made a left base turn, they were approximately 500 feet above ground level, with clouds at about 1,200 feet and heavy drizzle impacting visibility.

The ADSB data indicates that the aircraft was aligned on final approach at 10:14:12, rolling out of the turn onto the runway heading about 10:14:50 at 1,240 feet MSL and 114 knots.

At this point, the right seat pᴀssenger visually acquired the runway and provided guidance to the pilot, who also reported seeing the runway.

However, as they approached the runway, both airspeed and alтιтude began to decrease, continuing until the crash occurred.

The only significant increase in airspeed noted was a brief spike to 107 knots before dropping to 93 knots in the final five seconds of data.

The investigation revealed that the first point of impact was with a light station that was part of the runway alignment indicator lights, located approximately 1,400 feet from the runway threshold.

The aircraft subsequently struck a second light station and trees before crashing to the ground near the airport perimeter fence.

The main wreckage came to rest about 400 feet short of the runway threshold.

Upon examination of the wreckage, both engines remained attached, and the thrust reversers were found in the stowed position, indicating no evidence of an uncontained engine failure.

The throttle quadrant was also examined, showing both thrust levers in the full forward position, with reverse throttle levers stowed.

While some may speculate that full thrust implies an engine problem, a broader perspective suggests that the pilot may have become task-saturated, struggling to manage the aircraft in challenging weather and limited visibility.

It is plausible that, in the heat of the moment, the pilot attempted to pull back the throttles to manage airspeed but became too focused on the runway, forgetting to maintain power.

By the time he realized the aircraft was too slow, it was too late.

Importantly, the NTSB has not drawn this conclusion in their preliminary report, but it presents a reasonable hypothesis for the circumstances leading to the crash.

It raises the question of whether the presence of a fully qualified second-in-command in the right seat could have altered the outcome.

This tragedy serves as a stark reminder of the critical importance of thorough pre-flight briefings, clear communication among pilots, and the necessity of maintaining a safety margin during flight operations.

While the pilots may have made decisions they believed were reasonable at the time, they inadvertently eroded their safety margins to a point where they could no longer recover.

In conclusion, the NTSB’s preliminary report sheds light on the events leading up to the crash of Greg Biffle’s plane, revealing a complex interplay of decisions, weather conditions, and potential equipment failures.

As the investigation continues, it is crucial to learn from this tragedy to prevent similar incidents in the future.